Pierre Dehez 

will give a presentation on 

Sharing a collective probability of success

Abstract

How to allocate the probability of success resulting from the joint action of a group of players? To address this question, Hou et al. (Operations Research Letters 46, 2018) propose to use the Shapley value of a transferable utility game obtained by assuming probabilistic independence. The purpose of the present note is to analyze the properties of probability games and to study various solution concepts, in particular the core and the Shapley value. We give an axiomatic foundation of the Shapley value on the class of probability games and we investigate the link between different solution concepts, including asymmetric values.

To join the seminar, please follow the following instructions:

1. If you are a member of the CORE Brown Bag team on Microsoft Teams, an invitation to the scheduled meeting has been sent.

2. If you are not a member of the CORE BrownBag team on Microsoft Teams, please click here (https://teams.microsoft.com/l/team/19%3a165c5966a6f2467e8b56f507a93c159d%40thread.tacv2/conversations?groupId=65934fa3-0c36-4f5a-a9a3-dde65917d824&tenantId=7ab090d4-fa2e-4ecf-bc7c-4127b4d582ec) or write us an email.

3. The interface of Teams is very similar to Skype. When the presenter starts the videoconference, you will see in the team page the button "join". Just press it and you will be inside the video conference.

4. By the start of the seminar, you should mute your microphone. This should be done to avoid echoing noise problems. Whenever you want to intervene, please raise your hand or write in the chat that you want to do so. The presenter will stop, you can unmute yourself and intervene.

ps: If you want to present your work, please contact us. Find the calendar here: goo.gl/ld0IXf